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For over a century, numerous lawyers in the United States have devoted their 
careers to promoting and serving the public interest in some way. The public 
interest law movement more formally began in the 1960s and was grounded in a 
mission of using legal institutions to advance social justice causes.1 In essence, 
 
* Shauhin Talesh, Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. I would like to thank 
Tom Baker, Katherine Porter, and Dan Schwarcz for helpful comments on earlier drafts. An earlier 
version of this Article was presented at the Business Law as Public Interest Law Symposium held at 
UC Irvine School of Law in April, 2012. 
1. See Robert W. Gordon, Are Lawyers Friends of Democracy?, in THE PARADOX OF 
PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 31, 43–46 (Scott L. Cummings ed., 
2011); see also Helen Hershkoff & David Hollander, Rights into Action: Public Interest Litigation in the 
United States, in MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW RELATED WORK OF FORD FOUNDATION 
GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD 91 (Mary McClymont & Stephen Golub eds., 2000) (explaining 
how the Ford Foundation’s public interest law initiative was one of the original sparks of the public 
interest law movement); EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF 
THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 39 (1974) (noting that the federal legal services program was one of 
the original avenues for public interest lawyers to provide representation). See generally Scott 
Cummings, Reframing Public Services Law: Innovative Approaches to Integrating Public Service into the Legal 
Profession, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 355 (2011); Scott Cummings, The Internationalization of 
Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 891 (2008). 
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public interest lawyers attempt to “speak law to power”2 by providing access to 
justice for underrepresented individuals unable to afford representation,3 assisting 
traditionally marginalized groups unable to effectively change laws through the 
political process,4 and championing the fight for civil and criminal rights, 
consumer protection, the elderly, and the poor.5 Although public interest law was 
originally used to connote left-oriented reform activities, politically conservative 
activists in recent years have undertaken activities and advocacy in the name of the 
public interest.6 This has triggered a resurgence of scholarly interest devoted to 
mapping the organization, practice, and meaning of public interest law in the 
modern era.7 Suffice to say, what is public interest law is currently deeply 
contested and the subject of considerable debate.8 
This Article does not advocate for one meaning of public interest law over 
another, and therefore avoids engaging the current right-versus-left contestation 
over what public interest law means. Instead, I suggest that both sides of this 
debate conceptualize what is public interest law too narrowly. In particular, public 
interest law does not necessarily involve or require public interest lawyers. 
Moreover, public interest law does not only consist of lawyers litigating cases 
involving civil and criminal rights, environmental regulation, social welfare law, 
and consumer protection. Rather, there are other areas of law, in particular, 
business law, often outside the traditional social justice domains that can be 
mobilized and structured in ways that promote the collective good. Business law is 
not distinct from public interest law; it is a necessary component of public interest 
law. One business law area that at times serves the public interest is insurance law. 
This Article counters contemporary public interest law scholarship by 
arguing that insurance laws and regulations serve the public interest by enabling 
insurance to assist the very same unrepresented and underrepresented groups that 
public interest lawyers are often concerned with: the poor, minorities, the elderly, 
consumers, employees, and other marginalized groups. Insurance law is public 
interest law because insurance is at times foundational to the public interest. 
Moreover, insurance law is often necessary for insurance to work favorably for the 
 
2. Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING: 
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 69 (Austin Sarat & Stuart 
Scheingold eds., 1998). 
3. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004). 
4. See RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST 
APARTHEID, 1980–1994, at 1–3 (1995). 
5. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT, 1960–1973, at 40–41 (1993); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY 
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (2d ed. 2005). 
6. See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT 8–10 (2008); Ann Southworth, 
Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of “Public Interest Law,” 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223, 1224–
31 (2005). 
7. Cummings, Reframing, supra note 1, at 355–56. 
8. See infra notes 14–35 and accompanying text. 
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public. Using a series of examples from a number of lines of insurance, I highlight 
how insurance’s risk transfer, spreading, and distribution functions promote the 
public welfare by allowing injured victims to seek relief and compensation.9 Most 
importantly, insurance creates a collection scheme that allows people access to 
justice without necessarily requiring people to retain lawyers. This alone serves the 
public interest. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I begins by highlighting the various 
meanings of public interest law since the inception of the term in the 1960s. I 
show how the meaning of public interest law has evolved over time and is 
currently contested as liberal and conservative organizations both claim they are 
acting in the public interest. Part II explains the ways in which insurance law 
achieves many of the same goals public interest lawyers attempt to achieve. First, I 
argue that liability insurance finances the civil legal system and, more specifically, 
tort liability. Liability insurance assists unrepresented and underrepresented groups 
by providing a compensation scheme that allows injured victims to obtain relief 
for tort claims. Second, state insurance laws often require the purchase of certain 
lines of insurance. Specifically, I highlight how mandatory automobile insurance 
arose in part because many victims of automobile accidents did not have health or 
disability insurance and often failed to sue or successfully litigate their negligence 
claims. Thus, injured victims had no viable mechanism through which they could 
be compensated for their injuries. State-mandated automobile insurance laws 
ensure that risks that are difficult to predict will be pooled and spread, such that 
many losses connected to automobile use will be compensated. Liability insurance 
in general, and automobile insurance in particular, serve the public interest 
because they allow individuals, regardless of an injured victim’s race, gender, age, 
and socioeconomic status, to seek compensation for injuries without using a 
lawyer and going to court. To the extent that a lawyer is needed to pursue the case, 
lawyers are incentivized to take the case because they know they will be able to 
collect from the liability insurer. 
Part II.B highlights how workers’ compensation insurance also serves the 
public interest. State workers’ compensation statutes enacted in the early twentieth 
century addressed the rising number of work-related accidents and the fact that 
the litigation system was unpredictable, expensive, filled with delays, and often led 
to small recoveries for people with work-related injuries.10 Workers’ compensation 
laws enable workers’ compensation insurance to act in the public interest by 
allowing individuals suffering work-related injuries to receive compensation 
relatively quickly and without needing to obtain a lawyer and establish tort liability. 
Part II.C explains how various forms of health insurance in the United States 
that are codified and ultimately funded by state and federal governments, such as 
 
9. See infra notes 36–65 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 66–90 and accompanying text. 
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Medicare and Medicaid, allow many of the same groups public interest lawyers 
traditionally advocate for, i.e., the elderly, formerly working disabled, and those 
living in poverty, to receive health care where they otherwise would not be able 
to.11 Similar to automobile and workers’ compensation insurance systems, 
socialized forms of health insurance have the added benefit of allowing many 
unrepresented or underrepresented communities in society to receive health care 
services and benefits without needing to use a lawyer.12 Even when insurance does 
not function to assist the public, Part II.D shows how state insurance regulations 
guide and direct insurance company behavior toward the public interest by setting 
forth regulations designed to ensure insurer solvency, insured access and 
availability to insurance, fair rates, and fair business practices.13 
This Article concludes by calling for a deeper evaluation and reflection on 
the meaning of public interest law in society, one that goes beyond the issues that 
public interest lawyers traditionally address. In particular, rather than focusing on 
defining tight boundaries for what is public interest law and advancing the concept 
of social justice, public interest scholars may want to broaden their 
conceptualization and evaluate how many areas of law, including business law, 
promote and advance the public welfare. 
I. THE CONTESTED MEANING OF PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 
The term “public interest law” has evolved since its inception. Coined in the 
1960s, “public interest law” was initially a self-conscious effort to describe the 
rising trend toward using legal advocacy to advance and enhance a liberal political 
agenda.14 Public interest lawyers were recognized as unique not only for their 
commitment to social change, but also for their ability to use legal institutions to 
advance social causes.15 In particular, public interest lawyers turned to the federal 
courts to protect marginalized groups and promote their version of the public and 
collective good.16 After examining the public interest law movement in the 1970s, 
Burt Weisbrod described public interest law as “activity that (1) is undertaken by 
an organization in the voluntary sector; (2) provides fuller representation of 
 
11. See infra notes 91–115 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 91–115 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 116–131 and accompanying text. 
14. Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Law: Facing the Problems of Maturity, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 417, 417–23 (2010); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at 
Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2028–29 (2008). 
15. See Cummings, Internationalization, supra note 1, at 893–94. 
16. See Scott L. Cummings, The Future of Public Interest Law, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 
355, 367 (2011). 
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underrepresented interests (would produce external benefits if successful); and (3) 
involves the use of law instruments, primarily litigation.”17 
If successful, public interest activity provides more comprehensive 
representation of “some interest that is underrepresented in the sense that the 
interest has not been fully transmitted through either the private market or 
governmental channels.”18 Not surprisingly, the public interest law movement 
often involved discussing what public interest lawyers do for a living.19 Although 
there was disagreement about the definition, meaning, and theoretical justification 
for public interest law, and public interest lawyers in particular,20 there was general 
 
17. Burton A. Weisbrod, Conceptual Perspective on the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis, in 
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 4, 22 (Burton A. Weisbrod 
et al. eds., 1978). 
18. Id. at 20. 
19. See Charles R. Halpern & John M. Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest Law: 
Theory and Practice at the Center for Law and Social Policy, 59 GEO. L.J. 1095 passim (1971) (asserting that 
public interest lawyers were necessary to represent groups whose interests were underrepresented in 
administrative agencies and courts); Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public 
Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 231–61 (1976) (exploring the present and future consequences of 
public interest lawyers and legal reform); Robert L. Rabin, Abandoning Our Illusions: An Evaluation of 
Alternative Approaches to Law Reform, 27 STAN. L. REV. 191, 199–200 (1974) (“Yet another conception 
of public interest law . . . refer[s] to traditionally unrepresented interests—interests that do not 
necessarily relate to either consumer or majority concerns, or to any single, widely shared substantive 
value, but that nevertheless might otherwise remain unrepresented in a particular, significant 
controversy . . . From this perspective, to which I subscribe, the key to understanding public interest 
representation is access. . . . [A]nd to regard public interest advocacy as a modest corrective to the ever-
present threat of myopic policy formation dominated by economically powerful interests.”); Report of 
the Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, 100 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 625, 965 (1975) (“Public 
interest legal service is legal service provided without fee or at a substantially reduced fee, which falls 
into one or more of the following areas:” poverty law, civil rights law, public rights law, charitable 
organization representation, administration of justice.). 
20. The Council for Public Interest Law defined “public interest law” as: 
[T]he name that has recently been given to efforts to provide legal representation to 
previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in 
recognition that the ordinary marketplace for legal services fails to provide such services to 
significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and 
interests include the poor, environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities, and 
others. 
COUNCIL FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC 
INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 6–7 (1976). Others have attempted to define “public interest law.” See, 
e.g., JEREMY COOPER & RAJEEV DHAVAN, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 10 (1991) (“Public interest law 
involves in essence the use of a wide and diverse range of strategies to widen the access of the general 
populace to the sources of power and the decision making processes that affect their daily lives, 
specifically using the processes of the law to achieve this end.”); see also JEREMY COOPER, KEYGUIDE 
TO INFORMATION SOURCES IN PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 10 (1991) (“[W]hereas the details 
surrounding the precise definition of the term ‘public interest law’ are the subject of some controversy 
and divergence, there is remarkably consistent consensus as to what constitutes its broad themes.”); 
Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public 
Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 687, 687–89 (1991–1992); Edgar S. Cahn & 
Jean Camper Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?—The Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE 
L.J. 1005, 1006 (1970) (“[U]nderlying the currency of ‘public interest law’ is a newly emergent and 
valid understanding of the need to protect all members of society in their relatively passive capacity as 
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consensus that the basic goal of the public interest law movement was to assure 
the adequate representation of unrepresented and underrepresented interests and 
people.21 The original Ford Foundation program officers, Gordon Harrison and 
Sanford Jaffe, designed and developed the foundation’s public interest law funding 
initiative and defined public interest law as “the representation of the 
underrepresented in American society” for the “benefit of large classes of 
people.”22 Weisbrod and his co-authors identified a series of areas that public 
interest law activities at the time focused on: consumer protection, civil liberties, 
employment, education, health care, welfare benefits, education, housing, voting, 
occupational health and safety, and environmental protection.23 Moreover, they 
identified several underrepresented groups that public interest lawyers typically 
served at the time: the general public, women, children, prisoners, the elderly, the 
mentally impaired, racial and ethnic minorities, and those living in poverty.24 
Because of the ambiguity in the meaning of terms such as 
“underrepresented” and “public interest,” a wide variety of groups mobilized 
lawyers working in the nonprofit sector to achieve public policy goals.25 Unlike the 
 
citizens who consume not only material goods and services but also governmental policies and 
programs.”); Scott Cummings, The Market for Public Interest Law Services, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 1075, 1075 (2011) (public interest law is “the provision of legal services broadly defined to 
advance some vision of the public good beyond mere client representation”); Southworth, Conservative 
Lawyers, supra note 6, at 1236 (“Although there was considerable disagreement about the meaning and 
theoretical justification for this organizational form, public interest lawyers generally asserted that new 
types of organizations and lawyers were necessary to respond to the deficiencies of pluralism by 
representing groups whose interests were underrepresented in administrative agencies and courts.”); 
The Practice of Law in the Public Interest, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 797, 798 (1971) (“The term public interest law 
does not lend itself to precise definition. It clearly contemplates, however, the representation of 
diverse groups of people presently underrepresented in our society.”); Weisbrod, supra note 17. For a 
discussion of the challenges of defining the public interest, see Frank J. Sorauf, The Public Interest 
Reconsidered, 19 J. POL. 616 (1957). 
21. See NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980S 
AND BEYOND 3 (1989) (“Public interest law is the name given to efforts to provide legal 
representation to interests that historically have been unrepresented or underrepresented in the legal 
process. Philosophically, public interest law rests on the assumption that many significant segments of 
society are not adequately represented in the courts, Congress, or the administrative agencies because 
they are either too poor or too diffuse to obtain legal representation in the marketplace.”); Kenney 
Heglend, Beyond Enthusiasm and Commitment, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 805, 805 (1971) (“The basic goal of the 
public interest law movement is to assure adequate representation of currently unrepresented and 
underrepresented interests and peoples. Democratic theory and the adversary system require that all 
be heard. All are not. Thus, the large ‘public interest’ umbrella encompasses such diverse interests as 
racial equality, consumer protection, and ecology.”). 
22. Gordon Harrison & Sanford M. Jaffe, Public Interest Law Firms: New Voices for New 
Constituencies, 58 A.B.A. J. 459, 459 (1972); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
23. Weisbrod, supra note 17, at 29; Joel F. Handler et al., The Public Interest Law Industry, in 
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 17, at 42, 57 tbl.4.7; Burton A. Weisbrod, Part II Area Studies: Public 
Interest Law in Action, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 17, at 149, 149. 
24. Weisbrod, supra note 17, at 29; Handler et al., supra note 23, at 58 tbl.4.8. 
25. Southworth, Conservative Lawyers, supra note 6 (highlighting how conservative lawyers and 
groups created legal advocacy organizations anchored in a right-wing agenda under the framework 
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original public interest movement’s liberal, left-leaning ideology, these lawyers and 
the organizations they were affiliated with espoused a different view of public 
interest law anchored more in politically conservative values.26 Ann Southworth 
has shown how conservative and libertarian lawyers created legal advocacy 
organizations similar to the public interest organizations of the political left but 
dedicated to advancing a right-wing political agenda under the rubric of serving 
the public interest.27 These organizations attempted to achieve goals that were 
different from the goals of those individuals who originally founded the public 
interest law movement.28 Conservatives argued that “underrepresentation” was a 
politically contingent term that changed over time. Thus, on contentious issues of 
public policy, one organization’s conception of the public interest could be 
construed differently by another group. For example, conservatives argued that 
environmental regulation reduces the number of jobs for the public, and 
consumer regulation increases prices and leads to inefficient and inequitable 
results that are not in the public interest.29 Scott Cummings describes the 
contested public interest law landscape as follows: 
As a result, on the most contentious socio-political issues of the day, 
liberal public interest groups—standing for economic regulation, 
redistributive social welfare, the separation of church and state, the rights 
of criminal defendants, and protections for minority groups—have found 
themselves pitted against their conservative counterparts advocating a 
mirror-image agenda—free markets, small government, a prominent role 
for religion in public life, law and order, and an end to affirmative 
action.30 
As conservatives challenged the meaning of public interest law from the 
right, critics from the left argued that litigation and, rights-based rhetoric in 
particular, by themselves, were not adequate mechanisms for achieving social 
 
that these organizations were serving the public interest); see also SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE 
RIGHT, supra note 6 (describing the creation of conservative legal advocacy). 
26. See SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT, supra note 6; Southworth, Conservative 
Lawyers, supra note 6. 
27. See SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT, supra note 6; Southworth, Conservative 
Lawyers, supra note 6; see also STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL 
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE LAW (2008) (examining conservative mobilization in 
the context of law schools, public interest law groups, and the judiciary). 
28. SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT, supra note 6, at 8–29. 
29. See Scott L. Cummings, The Pursuit of Legal Rights—and Beyond, 59 UCLA L. REV. 506, 519 
(2012) (“In terms of efficiency, conservatives argued that it was not obvious that regulation benefited 
society at large, rather than simply making distributional choices. Thus, environmental regulation 
could have the effect of reducing jobs, or consumer regulation could increase prices. Without 
aggregating individual preferences for a clean environment and jobs, for consumer safety and low 
prices, it was not clear ex ante what the optimal social welfare function was. The concept of equity 
was also indeterminate. Who qualified as an underrepresented group? Conservatives argued that the 
concept of underrepresentation was politically contingent and changed over time.”). 
30. Cummings, supra note 16, at 369; see also Cummings, supra note 29. 
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change.31 This liberal critique of lawyer-led strategies argued that lawyer-
dominated advocacy weakened participatory democracy and ultimately 
disempowered the very societal actors public interest lawyers were advocating 
for.32 
In sum, since the development of the public interest law movement, the 
meaning of public interest law can only be described—at best—as ambiguous and 
deeply contested.33 The contested meanings reflect a deep political, ideological, 
and cultural struggle. Liberal and conservative groups’ jousting over the meaning 
of public interest law led to a series of inconsistent and competing definitions. 
Specifically, terms such as “public interest,” “unrepresented,” and 
“underrepresented” have taken on multiple meanings and interpretations by 
advocacy organizations. A variety of public interest advocacy organizations—
liberal and conservative—now claim to speak on behalf of unrepresented and 
underrepresented communities. As Scott Cummings notes, “contemporary public 
interest lawyering has moved beyond the founding conception and now can be 
understood as a diverse set of ideals and practices deeply engaged in the political 
fight to shape the very meaning of a just society”34 such that “forty years after the 
invention of public interest law, we no longer have a working definition of what 
exactly it is.”35 
The following section uses the existing framework as developed by public 
interest law advocates and scholars and highlights the ways in which insurance 
laws protect and serve many of the same unrepresented and underrepresented 
interests public interest lawyers—regardless of ideology—advocate for. Focusing 
on liability insurance, automobile insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, 
health insurance, and the insurance regulatory framework, I demonstrate how 
insurance allows underrepresented communities such as the elderly, the poor, the 
disabled, the mentally ill, employees, consumers, and the general public to obtain 
relief and compensation for injuries and harms that occur. Moreover, insurance 
does something that public interest law advocates do not necessarily highlight: 
insurance allows people to seek relief often without needing a lawyer. That is, 
through insurance laws, insurance-in-action sometimes works in the public 
interest. 
 
31. Cummings, supra note 29, at 520. 
32. Id. 
33. See Southworth, Conservative Lawyers, supra note 6, at 1236–37 (2005) (discussing the 
contested meaning and construction of the public interest law movement). 
34. Cummings, supra note 29, at 510. 
35. Id. at 517. 
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II. THE MULTI-FACETED WAYS THROUGH WHICH  
INSURANCE LAW SERVES THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
A. How Liability Insurance Laws Serve the Public Interest 
Liability insurance, as a system of insurance, serves the public interest in a 
very important way: it acts as the banker and financier for the civil litigation 
system. Without liability insurance, many underserved individuals who were 
innocently injured as the result of a tort by another person, regardless of the 
injured victim’s race, gender, age, or socioeconomic class, would not be 
compensated in our civil litigation system. A plaintiffs’ lawyer’s decision to 
represent an injured victim in a tort case is predicated not merely on proving the 
elements of a tort, but on collectability, i.e., “defendant’s ability to pay and the 
facility with which the defendant can be made to pay.”36 Over the past century, 
tort law has continually sought available sources of recovery and often creates and 
expands the liability of individuals and businesses that are likely to be covered by 
or have access to liability insurance.37 Insurance companies in turn responded by 
creating new forms of liability insurance to meet the new liabilities when existing 
insurance was not available.38 As tort law expands, so does liability insurance. 
Because of consumer debt, the ability of bankruptcy to discharge civil liabilities, 
and the few but important exceptions to the assets that must be liquidated in a 
bankruptcy proceeding, liability insurance is the primary asset plaintiffs can count 
on collecting in tort litigation in the United States.39 The presence of liability 
insurance and the credit economy in general produces solvent defendants and often 
shapes how plaintiffs and defense lawyers litigate cases.40 
 
36. Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort 
Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 4 (2005) (“For a lawyer considering whether to take a particular 
case on a contingency basis, however, or for a litigant considering whether to finance a claim upon 
some other basis, these legal elements are only a starting point. Liability by itself is not enough. The 
defendant must have the ability to pay.”). 
37. For a thorough examination of the relationship between tort law and liability insurance, 
see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 1–5, 220–25 (2008). 
38. See id. at 220.  
39. See Baker, supra note 36, at 4–5 (“My field research confirmed the obvious point that 
insurance is the asset that matters for all but the wealthiest of individual defendants and small 
organizations.”); see also Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WM. & MARY L. REV. 603, 610 
(2006) (asserting that “the principal mechanism for spreading tortiously caused losses is liability 
insurance”). 
40. See Steve Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 186 (2001). Steve 
Yeazell has noted how the rise of insurance and credit in the last seventy-five years has allowed 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants’ attorneys to flourish and sustain themselves: 
Instead, we need to connect some developments that individually will be quite well known, 
and to reflect on how they have transformed the practice of civil litigation, particularly the 
hemisphere focusing on torts. Broadly speaking, one can summarize these changes by 
saying that a large expansion of consumer credit and insurance created a vast pool of 
solvent potential defendants. As this happened, procedural changes made it possible to 
UCILR V2I3 Assembled v8 (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2012  5:35 PM 
994 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:985 
 
In fact, insurance law scholar Kenneth Abraham argues that the presence of 
liability insurance increases opportunities for legal change and promotes the 
general welfare because it incentivizes plaintiffs’ lawyers to litigate against 
defendants with insurance and potentially appeal cases: 
[T]he pace of legal change also may be affected by liability insurance 
because, other things being equal, plaintiffs, and plaintiffs’ attorneys, are 
less likely to pursue claims against defendants with limited assets. New law 
is not made when claims are not brought at all; there can be legal change only when 
cases are tried and appealed. Therefore, the greater willingness of plaintiffs to 
pursue claims against insured defendants, and the greater ability of 
liability insurers, as distinguished from ordinary individuals, to litigate and 
appeal cases, create more numerous opportunities for legal change.41 
Thus, liability insurance serves the public interest by creating and facilitating 
a collection process that allows injured victims to seek financial compensation for 
their injuries. Given the prevalence of liability insurance in society and its 
connection to the tort system, liability insurance allows victims the ability to 
pursue both deep pockets and more pockets. While public interest law is often 
correlated to what public interest lawyers do, here liability insurance serves the 
public good because it allows victims to seek relief without needing to retain a 
lawyer. To the extent litigation is necessary to resolve the case, liability insurance 
incentivizes plaintiffs’ lawyers to take cases because they know they can potentially 
collect against an insured defendant. In doing so, liability insurance makes 
recovery for underserved communities easier and faster. But for liability insurance, 
many tort victims would “lump” their losses and not file suit or would be forced 
to seek the assistance of a lawyer.42 
Insurance laws play an important role in allowing liability insurance to serve 
the public interest. The fact that individuals are often required either by law or 
contract to purchase liability insurance demonstrates that legislators, judges, and 
contracting parties recognize liability insurance as a predicate for tort liability and 
that victims of tort liability should have a mechanism through which they can seek 
relief for their injuries.43 The evolution of compulsory automobile insurance in the 
United States perhaps best exemplifies how liability insurance furthers the public 
interest by producing solvent defendants and enhancing the chance that deserving 
plaintiffs will succeed in actually recovering compensation for their injuries. 
 
probe more deeply into the minds and file cabinets of these defendants. . . . With credit has 
come liability insurance, and with liability insurance has come growth in “defendant 
populations.” 
Id. at 186–87. 
41. ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 224 (emphasis added). 
42. See William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 63, 81 (1974) (discussing how many victims of potentially legally cognizable claims do not 
actually take legal action and “lump” their losses instead). 
43. See Baker, supra note 36, at 5 (explaining that liability insurance has become “a de facto 
element of tort liability”). 
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In the early twentieth century, the exponential growth in the number of 
automobiles being driven on American roads led to an increase in the number of 
automobile accidents.44 These accidents often led to fatalities: 
Viewed by today’s standards, there was carnage on the roads. Over 
30,000 people were killed in auto accidents in 1930. This was 30 percent 
of all the accidental deaths that occurred that year. Today, there are about 
44,000 auto-related fatalities per year, constituting about 40 percent of all 
accidental deaths. But the effective fatality rate from driving in 1930 was 
nearly 20 times higher than it is today. In 1930 there were 28 deaths for 
every 100 million miles driven; today the rate is 1.46 deaths per 100 
million miles.45 
Coupled with the rising number of accidents was a dearth of viable avenues 
to seek compensation and relief for injuries. First, the vast majority of people 
lacked disability and health insurance.46 Second, although insurers responded by 
selling coverage for automobile liability, only twenty-five percent of drivers were 
insured in the 1920s.47 Third, drivers had a difficult time seeking recovery for their 
injuries through the litigation system.48 Accident victims could pursue litigation 
under negligence claims, but it was often difficult and costly to prove liability.49 
Moreover, typically a victim could not recover if she was contributorily 
negligent.50 This combination of a lack of available health and disability insurance, 
incomplete liability insurance, and a difficult negligence standard meant that only a 
small number of accident victims recovered compensation in tort. 
Most states responded by passing “financial responsibility laws.”51 These 
laws required a driver involved in an accident to post a bond or show other 
evidence of her financial ability to pay future claims in order to retain driving 
privileges.52 A driver typically satisfied this requirement by submitting proof that 
she had purchased liability insurance.53 In 1925, Connecticut was the first state to 
enact a financial responsibility law.54 By 1932, eighteen states had passed similar 
laws.55 Although these laws clearly served the public interest, they only helped 
ensure that a driver would be prepared and able to compensate a victim of a 
 
44. See ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 70. 
45. Id. at 71. 
46. See id. at 72 (discussing the challenges of obtaining compensation through other insurance 
sources). 
47. Id. at 71. 
48. Id. 
49. See id. at 71–72. 
50. See id. 
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future accident. These laws did not provide relief and compensation for the 
person subject to the current accident. 
Despite insurance company opposition, Massachusetts in 1927 enacted the 
first generally applicable compulsory automobile liability insurance legislation.56 
Unlike financial responsibility laws, this law required drivers to show their ability 
to cover damage caused by accidents in advance.57 Mandatory automobile 
insurance was an attempt to collectivize the cost of injuries. In particular, by 
purchasing automobile liability insurance, each driver would pass along the cost of 
the injuries she caused to a pool composed of other drivers. Making automobile 
insurance mandatory placed both tortfeasors and victims in the same risk pool and 
thus spread the cost of accidents among them.58 Legislators and the general public 
came to understand mandatory liability insurance as protecting the victim as much 
as the policyholder. In the 1960s, states increasingly began adopting compulsory 
insurance requirements in the automobile context.59 Today, forty-nine states and 
the District of Columbia require compulsory liability insurance for drivers.60 
Initially contested and controversial, mandatory automobile insurance laws serve 
 
56. For a comprehensive history of the manner in which automobile insurance became 
mandatory in the United States, see ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 72; see also M.G. WOODRUFF III ET 
AL., AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAW § 3:21, at 90 (1974). During this time, a group 
of scholars, lawyers, and judges affiliated with Columbia University produced a proposal for 
automobile liability and insurance reform that came to be known as the Columbia Plan. ABRAHAM, 
supra note 37, at 74–75. Modeled largely on workers’ compensation insurance, the plan envisioned 
mandatory purchase of automobile liability insurance by all owners of motor vehicles. The plan also 
proposed a no-fault theory of compensation such that victims would not be required to prove 
negligence in order to recover damages. Thus, the authors of the Columbia plan were more interested 
in securing compensation for victims than reducing the need for compensation by encouraging the 
prevention of accidents. Ultimately, the Columbia plan was not adopted due to opposition by 
insurance companies, a lack of consensus that automobile accidents—like workplace injuries—
warranted a no-fault compensation system, and the economic crisis resulting from the Depression. See 
id. 
57. See ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 72–74. 
58. For a thorough discussion of the risk-spreading function of mandatory automobile 
insurance, see Young B. Smith, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium—The Problem and Its 
Solution, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 785, 792 (1932). 
59. Insurance treatises at the time articulated the dual goals of automobile insurance, noting 
the purpose of mandatory automobile insurance was to “(1) Protect[ ] the tortfeasor of an automobile 
accident from financial disaster resulting from a judgment rendered against him in a court of law” and 
“(2) [p]rovide[ ] compensation for the victim of an accident for injuries received from the accident.” 
WOODRUFF ET AL., supra note 56, § 3:1, at 75. 
60. Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE (May 2012), 
http://www.iii.org/issues_updates/compulsory-auto-uninsured-motorists.html. Only New Hampshire 
does not have a compulsory automobile insurance liability law. Instead, New Hampshire requires all 
drivers to show they are financially responsible and requires drivers who have been convicted of 
driving under the influence to purchase automobile liability insurance. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264 
(2012); see also JERRY S. ROSENBLOOM, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY CLAIMS: INSURANCE COMPANY 
PHILOSOPHIES AND PRACTICES 4 (1968). 
UCILR V2I3 Assembled v8 (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2012  5:35 PM 
2012] INSURANCE LAW AS PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 997 
 
the public interest by making drivers financially responsible to others they injure in 
an accident and are now treated as a necessary cost of living in the United States.61 
Courts in particular have also done their share to promote victim 
compensation through the expansive interpretation of automobile liability 
insurance policy provisions.62 For example, courts flexibly interpret the “omnibus” 
clause63 and “arising out of the ownership, operation, or use” of the insured 
motor vehicle in ways that trigger coverage so that victims have a mechanism 
through which to seek compensation.64 In addition to courts, regulators eventually 
understood and evaluated liability insurance provisions as protecting not just the 
policyholder, but also the victim.65 As the scope of coverage provided in a 
standard automobile liability insurance policy expanded, it became more likely that 
innocent victims of automobile accidents would receive compensation. 
In sum, liability insurance in general, and mandatory automobile insurance 
laws in particular, serve the public interest by creating a risk-spreading system that 
makes those who cause accidents financially responsible to victims. Whereas 
injured persons were historically unable to obtain compensation for injuries when 
insurance was not required, liability insurance provides a mechanism for injured 
victims to seek relief. By legally requiring everyone who drives to have insurance, 
liability insurance creates a compensation system that allows injured victims to sue 
without necessarily having to obtain a lawyer and file a lawsuit. To the extent that 
a lawyer is needed to resolve an automobile dispute, the presence of liability 
insurance incentivizes plaintiffs’ lawyers to represent victims on a contingency 
basis because they know there is a likely source they can eventually collect from. 
 
61. See ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 102. Abraham explains how automobile insurance has 
become a part of American society: 
[I]nsurance turns many accidents that would have been a major financial misfortune into 
mere personal inconveniences. For most people, paying sizable sums for auto insurance 
has simply become a part of the background cost of living. The whole insurance and 
liability system for dealing with auto accidents has become so embedded in our lives that it 
is almost transparent. Auto liability is a prime example of how the routinization and 
bureaucratization in a field of liability tends to move it from the foreground to the 
background of public concern, despite the very substantial amount of money that is 
sometimes involved. 
Id. 
62. Id. at 79; see, e.g., Owens v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 109 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Ark. 
1937) (finding that liability for dropping a patient prior to loading her into an insured ambulance was 
covered); Mullen v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 191 N.E. 394, 395 (Mass. 1934) (finding that 
liability for an injury caused by oil leaking from an insured vehicle was covered); Quality Dairy Co. v. 
Fort Dearborn Cas. Underwriters, 16 S.W.2d 613, 614–15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929) (finding that liability 
for harm resulting from the detachment of a wagon from the insured vehicle was covered). 
63. In general, the omnibus clause provides coverage of liability incurred by anyone operating 
the insured vehicle with permission. See ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 78. 
64. Id. at 79 (“Each time the courts held that there was insurance in a borderline situation, 
they ensured not only that the driver was covered but also that the victim would have a source of 
recovery if his claim were successful.”). 
65. See id. at 78; Baker, supra note 36, at 2–7. 
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B. How Workers’ Compensation Insurance Laws Serve the Public Interest 
Established through legislative enactment, workers’ compensation insurance 
is another line of insurance that serves the public interest. Workers’ compensation 
systems provide benefits to employees suffering occupational injuries.66 An 
employee must prove an injury occurred during the course of employment, at 
which point the employer must provide medical care for the injured employee. 
Workers’ compensation insurance is not only a no-fault compensation scheme, 
but also a tort replacement system because it provides compensation without 
needing to establish tort liability.67 A workers’ compensation scheme serves 
multiple purposes: it reduces litigation in courts, it provides employees with a 
quick system through which to seek relief and compensation, and it manages costs 
for employers by spreading the costs through the purchase of insurance to cover 
workers’ injuries.68 
Prior to the passage of modern workers’ compensation laws, it was very 
difficult for injured workers to receive compensation for medical costs and lost 
wages from a work-related injury.69 In theory, a worker had the ability to file a tort 
suit against another worker who, due to negligence, had caused her injury. This 
right to sue was severely curtailed in the mid-nineteenth century by the adoption 
of the English doctrine of the fellow-servant rule in many states.70 Under the 
fellow-servant rule, a servant (employee) had no claim against the master 
(employer) for injuries caused by another worker.71 Instead, claims were limited to 
incidences where the employer was partially at fault.72 Occasionally, courts limited 
the application of the fellow-servant rule by allowing some dramatic work-related 
injuries to be compensated on a case-by-case basis.73 However, despite the fellow-
servant rule and other defenses such as contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk, the civil justice system continued receiving many work-related legal claims. In 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, work-related injuries significantly 
rose, in part due to the rise of industrial jobs: 
 
66. Gregory T. Presmanes & Seth Eisenberg, Hazardous Condition: The Status of Illegal Immigrants 
and Their Entitlement to Workers’ Compensation Benefits, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 247, 248 (2008). 
67. See MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 828, 834–35, 866–69 
(8th ed. 2006) (discussing how workers’ compensation insurance has long replaced the tort remedy 
with a no-fault compensation scheme); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 836–37 (2011) (discussing the replacement of tort remedies). 
68. Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 
COLUM. L. REV. 50, 67–71 (1967) (providing a lengthy discussion of the purposes of workers’ 
compensation insurance). 
69. See id. at 53–59 (tracing the evolution of workers’ compensation insurance in the United 
States); JAY E. GRENIG, PRENTICE HALL’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION HANDBOOK 101–02 (1987). 
70. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 68, at 53–59 (highlighting the evolution of the 
workers’ compensation doctrine). 
71. Id. at 53. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. at 59 (noting a few exceptions for unique factual situations). 
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One reason for the continued litigation may have been simply the great 
number of accidents that occurred. At the dawn of the industrial 
revolution, . . . the human consequences of that technological change 
were unforeseeable. In particular, the toll it would take of human life was 
unknown. But by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the number 
of industrial accidents had grown enormously. After 1900, it is estimated, 
35,000 deaths and 2,000,000 injuries occurred every year in the United 
States. One quarter of the injuries produced disabilities lasting more than 
one week. The railway injury rate doubled in the seventeen years between 
1889 and 1906.74 
Because few injured workers received compensation, labor unrest increased 
among workers and their unions.75 Under the earliest state employers’ liability 
statutes, the issue of liability and the amount awarded still depended upon court 
rulings and jury verdicts. However, the civil justice system and adjacent employer 
liability commissions were often filled with delays76 and expensive,77 and they 
often led to very small recoveries78 because lawyer fees absorbed much of the 
recovery.79 Thus, lost wages and medical costs were very hard to recoup in that 
 
74. Id. at 60. 
75. See id. at 65–66. 
76. See id. In 1910, the New York Employers’ Liability Commission reported that delays ran 
from six months to six years: 
The injured workman is driven to accept whatever his employer or an insurance company 
chooses to give him or take his chance in a lawsuit. Half of the time his lawsuit is doomed 
to failure because he has been hurt by some trade risk or lacks proof for his case. At best 
he has a right to retain a lawyer, spend two months on the pleadings, watch his case from 
six months to two years on a calendar and then undergo the lottery of a jury trial, with a 
technical system of law and rules of evidence, and beyond that appeals and perhaps 
reversals of questions that do not go to the merits. . . . If he wins, he wins months after his 
most urgent need is over. 
Id. at 66; see also W.F. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION 23–24 (1936). 
77. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 68, at 66. 
78. See id. Drawing from data obtained from the New York Employers’ Liability Commission, 
Friedman highlighted injured workers’ recovery was low: 
When an employee did recover, the amount was usually small. The New York Commission 
found that of forty-eight fatal cases studied in Manhattan, eighteen families received no 
compensation; only four received over $2,000; most received less than $500. The deceased 
workers had averaged $15.22 a week in wages; only eight families recovered as much as 
three times their average yearly earnings. The same inadequacies turned up in Wisconsin in 
1907. Of fifty-one fatal injuries studied, thirty-four received settlements under $500; only 
eight received over $1,000. 
Id. at 66; see also DODD, supra note 76, at 19–21. 
79. See Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1439, 1505 (2005) (highlighting the challenges employees faced when bringing lawsuits against 
employers); see also Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 68, at 66–67. Friedman highlighted the 
challenges of using the litigation system to seek relief and noted recoveries were often very small: 
Litigation costs consumed much of whatever was recovered. It was estimated that, in 1907, 
“of every $100 paid out by [employers in New York] on account of work accidents but 
$56 reached the injured workmen and their dependents.” And even this figure was 
unrepresentative because it included voluntary payments by employers. “A fairer test of 
employers’ liability is afforded by the $192,538 paid by these same employers as a result of 
law suits or to avoid law suits, whereof only $80,888, or forty-two percent, reached the 
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climate. While employees found the litigation process unpredictable and onerous, 
employers also did not like the potential for unpredictable jury verdicts, high court 
costs, and difficult negotiations with insurance companies regarding these claims.80 
Against this backdrop, state workers’ compensation schemes emerged in the 
early twentieth century in the United States in order to benefit employers and 
workers by replacing uncertain remedies and relief with certain ones.81 These 
workers’ compensation statutes eliminated the process of using courts to establish 
civil liability in cases involving work-related injuries. Under workers’ 
compensation statutes, compensation was based on statutory schedules and the 
responsibility for initial determination of employee claims was removed from the 
courts and given to an administrative agency.82 Most states also abolished the 
fellow-servant rule and the ability to invoke defenses such as assumption of risk 
and contributory negligence.83 Employees and employers avoided the expenses 
and risks of tort litigation as work-related injury disputes were funneled to a 
presumably more efficient administrative system.84 The compensation scheme for 
employers who elect to come under the program is the exclusive remedy for an 
employee injured accidentally on the job.85 These systems are designed to provide 
compensation to the injured employee in a nonadversarial manner without regard 
to fault. Employers received immunity from suit in return for paying premiums to 
support the system.86 
After a few states initially passed workers’ compensation statutes, the rest of 
the states followed. Employers and legislators determined it was in their interest to 
indemnify injured workers with set schedules, caps, and insurance than to risk 
going to court where damages could vary wildly.87 From 1911 to 1948, all fifty 
states passed some form of workers’ compensation statutes and thereby reduced 
the flood of litigation by giving employers fixed liability for an employee’s injury, 
provided that the injury qualified.88 Currently, workers’ compensation programs in 
 
beneficiaries.” A large fraction of the disbursed payments, about one-third, went to 
attorneys who accepted the cases on a contingent basis. 
Id. at 66 (internal citation omitted). 
80. Oliver T. Beatty, Workers’ Compensation and Hoffman Plastic: Pandora’s Undocumented Box, 55 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1211, 1221–22 (2011) (noting the problems both employees and employers had with 
the civil justice system). 
81. Research on behalf of state commissions revealed that creating a workers’ compensation 
scheme would be no more expensive than the current litigation scheme. Most commissions also 
recommended creating a workers’ compensation scheme that fixed liability upon the employer 
regardless of fault. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 68, at 70–71. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. See Joan T.A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers’ Compensation Systems: Is Federal Reform 
the Answer?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1089 (1999). 
85. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 68, at 71. 
86. See Grenig, supra note 69, at 102. 
87. Beatty, supra note 80, at 1222. 
88. Id. 
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the United States cover over 125 million workers, cost employers over $60 billion, 
and pay out approximately $50 billion in benefits.89 As this brief history highlights, 
the workers’ compensation system emerged from a desire to create a new, 
workable, and predictable mode of handling accident liability that balanced the 
interests of labor and management. 
This Article does not suggest that workers’ compensation schemes are 
foolproof. Clearly, they are not perfect systems and reform efforts are ongoing.90 
However, as with automobile insurance, workers’ compensation laws serve the 
public interest in a number of ways. First, workers’ compensation laws assist some 
of the very same groups public interest lawyers advocate for: employees, the poor, 
injured victims, and those traditionally underserved and underrepresented. Second, 
workers’ compensation insurance allows for a subsegment of the tort victim 
population—those accidentally injured at work—to receive compensation and 
relief without needing to establish fault. Third, workers, for the most part, can 
receive compensation and move through the workers’ compensation system 
without needing to use a lawyer. Fourth, workers’ compensation insurance 
systems reduce the amount of litigation in courts and increase employee access to 
relief and compensation. Finally, workers’ compensation schemes provide policy 
incentives for workplace safety and employee protection, which of course serve 
the public interest. 
C. How Health Insurance Laws Serve the Public Interest 
As with mandatory automobile insurance and workers’ compensation 
insurance, the socialized aspects of health insurance serve many of the same 
underserved and underrepresented communities public interest lawyers 
traditionally serve. Social insurance “is the policy of organized society to furnish 
 
89. See Lin, supra note 79, at 1505; see also CECIL THOMPSON WILLIAMS ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. 
OF SOC. INS., WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: BENEFITS, COVERAGE, AND COSTS, 2001, at 2 (2003). 
90. Both employers and employees have complained about the workers’ compensation 
system: 
Over the past two decades, employers have complained about the escalating costs of the 
workers’ compensation system, while employees have complained of inadequate 
compensation. Although costs stabilized in the mid-1990s, with the number of claims 
following a downward trend, overall costs have risen dramatically in the last few years. 
These increases may be due to rising medical costs, to attempts by insurers to compensate 
for having previously charged insufficient premiums, or to increased involvement of 
lawyers in the claims process. Meanwhile, the decline in benefits has been blamed on the 
introduction of managed care and other cost-controls. 
Lin, supra note 79, at 1506. See generally Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ 
Compensation “Reform,” 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 683–703 (1998) (describing the workers’ 
compensation “crisis” of rising costs and diminishing benefits); Eston W. Orr, Jr., Note, The Bargain Is 
No Longer Equal: State Legislative Efforts to Reduce Workers’ Compensation Costs Have Impermissibly Shifted the 
Balance of the Quid Pro Quo in Favor of Employers, 37 GA. L. REV. 325, 351–52, 356–57 (2002) (arguing 
that some states altered the balance crucial to workers’ compensation by raising their compensability 
standards, lowering disability payments, limiting medical benefits, restricting litigation costs, and 
expanding employer immunity). 
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that protection to one part of the population, which some other part may need 
less, or, if needing, is able to purchase voluntarily through private insurance.”91 
Typically, insurance is considered social if the insurance is compulsory and easily 
available, and the price bears some relation to the ability to pay.92 
Through various laws, state and federal governments finance a number of 
health care institutions and programs that are popularly conceived of as social 
insurance and, consequently, serve many of the communities public interest 
lawyers serve, as well as the public interest more broadly.93 For example, the 
federal government provides health care to millions of veterans in 1400 veterans’ 
hospitals, clinics, and nursing facilities; TRICARE94 provides over 5.5 million 
members of the military and their dependents health care; approximately 600 
facilities run by the Indian Health Service provide 1.5 million Native Americans 
with health care; and a variety of special groups, through block grants to the states, 
provide funding for health care relating to maternal and child health, alcohol and 
drug abuse treatment, mental health, preventive health, and primary care.95 State 
governments also provide health care through more traditional programs, such as 
state mental hospitals, state university hospitals, and workers’ compensation.96 
However, states also increasingly provide health care through insurance pools for 
the high-risk uninsured, pharmaceutical benefit programs, and programs to 
provide health insurance for the uninsured poor.97 Aside from health care 
provided at the federal and state levels, county and local governments also operate 
local hospitals.98 When the cost of direct government health care programs is 
added to the cost of government employee health benefits and tax subsidies that 
support private health insurance benefits, tax-financed health care spending in the 
United States amounts to sixty percent of total health care spending.99 
Of course, the largest socialized or public health care programs are the 
federal Medicare program and the state and federal Medicaid programs. Medicare 
 
91. I.M. RUBINOW, SOCIAL INSURANCE 3 (1913). 
92. Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1579 (2011) (“While all insurance is social—so that ‘the loss 
lighteth rather easily upon many than heavily upon few’—to be considered social insurance in the 
traditional sense, the insurance must be compulsory and easily available, and the price must bear some 
relation to the ability to pay.”) (internal citation omitted). 
93. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 369 (6th ed. 2008). 
94. TRICARE, more formally known as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the 
Uniformed Services, is the health care program serving active duty military service members, National 
Guard, and Reserve members, retirees, and their families. What is TRICARE?, TRICARE, http:// 
tricare.mil/mybenefit/home/overview/WhatIsTRICARE (last updated June 12, 2012). 
95. FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 369. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. 
99. See Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Paying for National Health Insurance—And 
Not Getting It, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2002, at 88, 91, 93. 
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helps the elderly and formerly working disabled receive health care.100 Medicare 
covers nearly thirty-seven million elderly and 6.6 million disabled beneficiaries and 
is generally linked to another major social insurance program in the United States: 
Social Security.101 Medicare has generally been successful in securing broad access 
to health care for many people who would otherwise be uninsured.102 In 
particular, Medicare pays for approximately forty-nine percent of the health care 
received by the elderly in the United States.103 “Almost half of Medicare 
beneficiaries have incomes of 200 percent of the federal poverty level or less, and 
sixty percent of elderly Medicare beneficiaries receive at least half of their income 
from Social Security.”104 While not a perfect program, Medicare has helped the 
poor and elderly, two groups that public interest lawyers often represent, receive 
higher levels of health care than they would otherwise receive. 
Medicaid also serves many underrepresented groups, especially certain 
categories of the poor. In particular, Medicaid is available on a national basis for 
pregnant women, children (including disabled children), parents of dependent 
children, and low-income elderly and disabled Medicare recipients (known as 
“dual eligibles”).105 Eligibility is almost always related to economic need, and 
virtually every Medicaid applicant must show that his or her income and resources 
fall below certain levels set by the states pursuant to broad federal guidelines. 
These individuals must meet state-determined income ceilings that vary by 
category, though there is a national floor for some categories.106 Medicaid 
coverage has often been relegated to certain categories of “deserving poor,” 
“categorically needy” and “medically needy,” though there has been a recent shift 
toward decoupling Medicaid eligibility from welfare recipient status.107 Although 
 
100. See Baker, supra note 92, at 1579. In general, Medicare covers seniors, i.e., “those who 
paid, or were married to someone who paid, Social Security taxes for forty quarters” or disabled, i.e., 
those “who paid, or were dependents of someone who paid, Social Security taxes for forty quarters 
before becoming totally disabled.” Id. at 1581. See generally PATRICIA A. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R41436, MEDICARE FINANCING (2011) (explaining the history and the financing of 
Medicare). 
101. FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 369–74. 
102. See id. 
103. Id. at 374. 
104. Id. at 373. 
105. Baker, supra note 92, at 1584 (explaining Medicaid eligibility requirements); see also 
FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 397–99. 
106. Baker, supra note 92, at 1584 (“[I]ndividuals had to meet state-determined income 
ceilings that varied by category . . . : 100% of the index for the elderly, disabled, and children aged 7 to 
19, and 133% of the index for pregnant women and children 6 years of age or younger.”). 
107. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) abandons the concept of 
“deserving poor” altogether. In 2014, all United States lawful residents with family incomes less than 
133% of the federal poverty level will be entitled to Medicaid. Combined with Medicare, Medicaid 
insures approximately a quarter of the American population. See id. 
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Medicaid does not cover all of America’s poor, when combined with Medicare, 
Medicaid insures approximately a quarter of the American population.108 
These social insurance components of our health care system serve the 
public interest in a number of ways, including by increasing access to health care 
and by broadening the safety net.109 The socialized components of the health 
insurance system also build into the health care system mechanisms that promote 
the health and safety of individuals living in American society.110 More specifically, 
through Medicare and Medicaid, the elderly, formerly working disabled, and 
certain categories of the poor, including all children in low-income families, are 
able to receive health care where they otherwise might not be able to. Further, 
individuals are also able to access health care services and benefits without 
needing to employ a public interest lawyer to advocate on their behalf. 
Part of the current political, economic, and cultural debate over the viability 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA) is whether American society 
is prepared to treat health insurance as serving the public good or simply as an 
individual commodity. For decades, United States income tax and employment 
law encouraged the provision of general health benefits through employment and 
thus made employment-based health insurance a practical obligation for many 
small employers and some large employers.111 However, employers still 
 
108. FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 370. 
109. For articles arguing that health insurance promotes health, and access to care in 
particular, see, for example, Lawrence O. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care? The Effect of the 
Health Care System on the Health of America, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 9–10 (1994–1995) (noting that 
access to care is a critical component to promoting health and that “promotion of the health of the 
population is the most important objective of health care reform”); Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: 
What’s Insurance Got to Do With It? Recognizing Health Insurance as a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 436, 450 (2010) (“A more transparent approach to reform would make explicit that health 
plans constitute a valuable, separate species of insurance designed primarily to finance socially 
beneficial health services by spreading the cost of care.”). For articles arguing that the lack of 
insurance or insufficient insurance leads to poorer health, see, for example, COMM. ON THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INST. OF MED., HIDDEN COSTS, VALUE LOST: UNINSURANCE 
IN AMERICA 4 (2003) (“[T]he aggregate, annualized cost of the diminished health and shorter life 
spans of Americans who lack health insurance is between $65 and $130 billion annually for each year 
of health insurance foregone.”) (emphasis omitted); Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the 
United States, J. ECON. LITERATURE 571, 582–83 (2008) (highlighting studies that note the adverse 
impact a lack of insurance has on health); Diane Rowland & Adele Shartzer, America’s Uninsured: The 
Statistics and Back Story, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 618, 618 (2008) (“The large and growing number of 
uninsured people is of concern because health coverage makes a difference in whether and when 
people get necessary medical care, where they get their care, and ultimately how healthy people are.”). 
110. See Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1876–78 (2010) (noting that one of 
the major conceptions of health insurance is that it promotes health). 
111. See Alain C. Enthoven & Victor R. Fuchs, Employment-Based Health Insurance: Past, Present, 
and Future, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1538, 1538–39 (2006) (“The exemption of employer payments for health 
insurance from employees’ taxable income, combined with substantial efficiency advantages of group 
over individual insurance, fueled rapid expansion [in employment-based insurance].”). 
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maintained the legal choice to offer health insurance while individuals’ only health 
insurance obligations have been to pay Medicare taxes and participate in financing 
Medicaid through the payment of their ordinary state and federal taxes.112 Starting 
in 2014, the PPACA will require large employers to purchase insurance for their 
employees’ entire lifetime. Moreover, for the first time in U.S. history, the PPACA 
abandons the concept of the “deserving poor” and expressly recognizes a national 
entitlement to health care for all of the poor—including working-age, able-bodied 
individuals—which will be financed through tax revenues.113 Thus, the PPACA 
and HCERA attempt to create health care solidarity through a combination of 
“private ownership, markets, choice and individual responsibility.”114 Proponents 
of the PPACA clearly see the law as recognizing health insurance as a public good, 
while opponents view health insurance as an individual choice. While the Supreme 
Court in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius was fairly careful not to 
address the policy merits of the PPACA, its decision upholding the PPACA and 
the individual mandate as a permissible tax115 in essence allows many aspects of 
American health insurance to be treated as compulsory, socialized, and serving the 
public interest. 
D. How Insurance Regulations Serve the Public Interest 
When insurance by itself does not function to assist the public, state 
regulation attempts to equalize the power imbalance and steer insurance 
companies toward maintaining services and products that serve the public interest. 
To begin with, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized almost a century ago that 
insurance is business that implicates the public interest.116 States have followed the 
Supreme Court’s lead by developing a regulatory framework that tries to protect 
the public. 
For example, each state’s insurance department has broad, legislatively 
delegated powers to enforce state insurance laws, promulgate rules and 
regulations, and conduct hearings to resolve disputed matters. State insurance 
commissioners in particular are afforded broad discretion and power because their 
 
112. See Baker, supra note 92, at 1579 (highlighting the distinctions between the current health 
care model and President Obama’s PPACA and HCERA). 
113. See id. at 1584–86. 
114. Id. at 1579. Baker notes that this approach is anchored in earlier conceptions of insurance 
as being “mutual”: 
While some might regard this contract as the unnatural union of opposites—solidarity on 
the one hand and markets, choice, and individual responsibility on the other—those 
familiar with insurance history will recognize in the Act an effort to realize the dream of 
America’s early insurance evangelists: a “society united on the basis of mutual insurance.” 
Id. at 1579–80 (internal citation omitted). 
115. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595–96 (2012). 
116. See, e.g., German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 411–15 (1914) (noting the 
business of insurance is in the public interest and therefore justifies rate regulation by legislation). 
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primary responsibilities are to protect the public.117 As articulated by most states, 
the goals of insurance regulation include fair pricing of insurance, protecting 
insurance company solvency, preventing unfair practices by insurance companies, 
and ensuring the availability of insurance coverage.118 In doing so, insurance 
regulation helps ensure solvency and the insurer’s ability to pay claims in the 
future, standardizes policy coverage, requires fair claims processing, and mandates 
certain levels of minimum coverage along particular lines of insurance.119 
Moreover, insurance laws and regulations that prohibit risk classification and 
segmentation result in redistribution to groups in need.120 All states have the 
power to approve insurance rates, to periodically conduct financial examinations 
of insurers, license companies, agents, and brokers, and to monitor and regulate 
claims-handling practices.121 
Insurance regulation uses a number of specific regulatory tools aimed at 
preserving solvency of insurance companies and, consequently, protecting 
consumers of insurance. State regulation subjects insurance companies to a series 
of requirements all aimed at making sure insurance companies are financially 
 
117. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 103 (4th ed. 2007) (“The 
Department of Insurance exercises authority delegated to it by the legislature. The primary 
responsibility of the Insurance Commissioner is to protect the public, and to that end the authority of 
the Commissioner is usually stated broadly. As an implementer of law, the Commissioner makes ‘law’ 
in a broad sense.”); see also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL 
THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38–41 (1986) (providing a brief analysis of the role of the typical 
Insurance Commissioner). 
118. Jerry articulates the purpose of insurance regulation as follows: 
Although the larger objectives of insurance regulation are to prevent destructive 
competition, compensate for inadequate information, relieve unequal bargaining power, 
and assist consumers incapable of rationally acting in their best interests, the articulated 
objectives of state legislative regulation are essentially fourfold: (1) ensuring that 
consumers are charged fair and reasonable prices for insurance products; (2) protecting the 
solvency of insurers; (3) preventing unfair practices and overreaching by insurers; and (4) 
guaranteeing the availability of coverage to the public. 
JERRY, supra note 117, at 90–91. See also TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 640 (2d ed. 
2008) (“Access and availability regulation is a relatively new feature on the insurance regulatory 
landscape. As the name suggests, these regulations are directed at ensuring that insurance is available 
and that people have access both to insurance and to the goods and services for which insurance is 
required.”); Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of 
Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1961). 
119. See JERRY, supra note 117, at 90–103; Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: 
Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 
627–29 (1999) (discussing the goals of an insurance regulatory scheme). 
120. See Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and 
Insurance, 56 TAX. L. REV. 157 (2003). 
121. See, e.g., NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES §§ VI-1775-1, VI-
1780-1 (Property & Casualty Model Rating Law); id. § III-390-1 (Model Law on Examinations); id. § 
III-320-1 (Organization and Ownership of New Insurance Companies); id. § II-218-1 (Producer 
Licensing Model Act); id. § VI-880-1 (Unfair Trade Practices Act); id. § VI-900-1 (Unfair Claims 
Settlement Practices Act). 
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sound.122 Some examples include capital requirements, financial reporting and 
accounting disclosures, limits on the kinds and types of investments insurance 
companies can make with funds held in reserve to pay claims, and requirements 
that insurance companies provide a legitimate basis for insurance rates they charge 
consumers.123 When solvency regulations fail to prevent insurance companies 
from failing, states use guaranty funds, which provide a way for insureds to seek 
coverage in the event that their insurance company becomes insolvent.124 
Insurance guaranty funds are an emergency measure that requires surviving 
insurance companies to provide funds to cover an insolvent insurer’s claims. In 
short, guaranty funds protect consumers by paying all or a portion of the insolvent 
insurer’s claims.125 
Insurance regulation also attempts to ensure availability of insurance 
coverage through regulations relating to residual market mechanisms. Residual 
market mechanisms establish a means for people to purchase insurance when 
there is no other insurer willing to provide insurance to them at a lower price than 
that charged in the residual market.126 Residual market structures are most 
common in areas in which there is mandatory insurance, such as automobile 
insurance and workers’ compensation.127 However, many states also have residual 
market mechanisms for property and health insurance.128 If there were no residual 
market mechanisms in place, insurance companies “could control access to many 
goods and services that require insurance” and potentially shut out individuals in 
need of insurance.129 
State insurance regulation serves the public interest in part because insurance 
policies are complex and consumers often have a difficult time obtaining 
information concerning what insurance policies and provisions mean. Consumers 
are not well equipped to assess a company’s future solvency, evaluate a company’s 
claims handling practices, or compare coverage in various policies.130 Consumers 
 
122. See BAKER, supra note 118, at 637–40 (analyzing the ways in which state regulation 
protects the public). See generally JERRY, supra note 117, at 61–140, for a comprehensive explanation 
of the features of insurance regulation. 
123. See BAKER, supra note 118, at 638–39. 
124. For background on guaranty funds, see DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: 
GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 264–71 (2002). 
125. BAKER, supra note 118, at 683–84 (explaining the value of guaranty funds to consumers). 
126. See id. at 640 (highlighting the basic parameters for how a residual market mechanism 
works). See generally Carol A. Heimer, Insuring More, Ensuring Less: The Costs and Benefits of Private 
Regulation Through Insurance, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 116 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds. 2002). 
127. See BAKER, supra note 118, at 640. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1412–22 (2007) (highlighting the limited information that consumers 
have about insurance); Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1263, 1266 (2011) (“Despite massive marketing campaigns by insurers emphasizing the importance of 
UCILR V2I3 Assembled v8 (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2012  5:35 PM 
1008 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:985 
 
invest large sums of money in insurance coverage in advance of making a claim on 
a policy. Thus, the value of insurance to consumers lies in the future performance 
by insurance companies of the various contingent obligations they agree to 
provide. Some examples of the interests insurance protects include an individual’s 
future ability to provide for dependents in case of death or injury, to retire, to 
obtain necessary medical treatment, to replace damaged or destroyed property, 
and to be compensated for bodily injury. Regulating the insurance industry 
increases the likelihood that insurers will fulfill their obligations upon receiving a 
covered claim from an insured. 
Obviously, I am not suggesting that insurance regulation always works. 
Clearly, insurance regulation often falls short of achieving its goals.131 The 
insurance regulatory framework, however, does attempt to at least steer insurance 
company behavior toward being more in line with the public interest by taking 
steps to ensure insurer solvency, curb unfair business practices, establish fair rates, 
and ensure the access and availability of insurance. 
CONCLUSION 
Insurance does not always serve the public interest. However, this Article 
explores how insurance laws and regulatory schemes—at times—allow insurance 
to serve many of the same interests public interest lawyers serve: the 
unrepresented, the underrepresented, the injured, consumers, employees, children, 
women, minorities, the elderly, the mentally ill, and the poor. In addition to 
liability insurance financing the civil litigation system, state laws require people to 
purchase automobile insurance and allow employers to opt into state-created 
workers’ compensation insurance schemes. In doing so, insurance laws provide 
injured persons with insurance mechanisms through which to seek relief. Health 
insurance laws such as Medicaid and Medicare assist the poor and the elderly (and 
other groups) by increasing access to care to those who may not otherwise be able 
to purchase health insurance. Though not perfect, insurance regulation, in 
addition to court decisions, attempts to ensure that insurance companies follow 
through on their promises, remain solvent, and avoid unfair business practices. 
Without insurance laws and regulations, policyholders could not possibly trust 
 
coverage in addition to premiums, it is currently virtually impossible for ordinary consumers to 
compare the scope of coverage that different carriers provide. Insurers do not make their policy 
language available to consumers until after they purchase coverage. Apart from several high-end 
carriers, insurers do not describe coverage in their marketing materials with sufficient specificity to 
allow for an assessment of their policies’ comparative breadth.”). 
131. See, e.g., JERRY, supra note 117, at 105–12 (highlighting the challenges of state insurance 
regulatory frameworks); Randall, supra note 119, at 664–85 (examining and challenging justifications 
for continuing state regulation of insurance); Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 130, at 1263–71; 
Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance Regulation? Against Regulatory Competition in 
Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1755–72 (2010). 
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insurers to pay claims or remain solvent.132 Using a series of examples, I 
highlighted how insurance is a system of risk spreading, transfer, and distribution 
that promotes the public good and often allows individuals to seek compensation 
without needing to use a lawyer. Insurance law is a necessary component of public 
interest law because it provides a collection mechanism for injured persons 
seeking compensation and relief for injuries. 
While the definition of public interest law is currently ambiguous and 
contested by liberal and conservative groups, neither group sufficiently captures 
what is public interest law. Too often the public interest law movement is defined 
by what public interest lawyers do for a living. The public interest law movement 
should account for the ways in which legal systems can actually serve the public 
interest by allowing underserved communities to seek relief without needing a 
lawyer. Public interest law does not necessarily require a public interest lawyer. 
Business law areas such as insurance law at times serve the public interest in a 
variety of capacities that are overlooked in the traditional discourse over what 
constitutes public interest law. Thus, public interest law scholars would be well 
served to focus less on defining what is public interest lawyering and more on 
concrete descriptions of the ways systems of law promote the general welfare. 
Only then will we begin to see the multi-faceted and diverse ways in which law 
serves the public interest. 
  
 
132. See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the British and 
American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TULANE L. REV. 735, 741–50 (2009). 
